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Allowing firms to collude in R&D can raise the level of R&D investments but weakens 
authorities’ control over monopoly power. In this paper an alternative (balanced budget) 
policy, that of subsidising R&D, is analysed. It is shown that subsidising R&D optimally 
raises social welfare and is more effective in promoting R&D investments than permitting 
R&D-cartels or RJVs. Also, subsidising non-cooperative R&D or subsidising an R&D-cartel 
leads to the same market outcomes. Abandoning anti-trust legislation concerning R&D, as is 
currently being done by the EC authorities, is not supported therefore by the analysis 
presented here. In stead, authorities should encourage firms to participate in RJVs and 
subsidise this agreement accordingly.
1 am indebted to Frans Meershoek (Erasmus University Rotterdam) with whom ! did part of the preliminary 
analysis for this paper under the capable supervision of Sanjeev Goyal (Erasmus University Rotterdam). Valuable 
comments on an earlier version of this research were given by Jean-Marie Viacne (Erasmus University Rotter­























































































































































































According to European legislation firms are not allowed to participate in 
cartels. However, in its Regulation 418/85 the European Commission granted a 
thirteen-year block exemption under Article 85 para.3 to collusion in research 
and development (R&D)1. This exemption is justified by the alleged effect of 
cooperative R&D in narrowing the fundamental gap between social and private 
incentives to invest in R&D2.
Inspired by this practice a substantial literature has developed on R&D 
cooperation3 45. In particular Claude d’Aspremont and Alexis Jacquemin (1988, 
1990) have developed a two-stage Cournot model with explicit technological 
spillovers to analyse collusive R&D. In the first stage firms determine their 
R&D investment. Given this investment, output is set in the second stage. Three 
different regimes are considered: first, no cooperation in either the first or the 
second stage; second, cooperation in R&D and competition in output; third, 
cooperation in both the first and the second stage. D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 
conclude that cooperation in R&D leads to an increase in R&D expenditures 
when spillovers are substantial, i.e. when a substantial part of each firm’s R&D 
benefits flow without payment to competing firms. In case of small spillovers 
the outcome is reversed45.
Implicitly d’Aspremont and Jacquemin consider only ’R&D-cartels’: 
"agreements to coordinate R&D activities so as to maximize the sum of overall
1 See Jacquemin (1988) and Martin (1994) for a discussion of this policy.
2 Katz and Ordover (1990) identify several forces which create the discrepancy between 
social and private incentives to conduct R&D. Also, depending on the industry, Bernstein and 
Nadri (1988) estimate the social rate of return to R&D capital to be 0.1 to 10 times the 
private rate of return.
3 See a.o. Bozeman et al. (1986), Kamien and Zang (1993), Simpson and Vonortas (1994) 
and the other references in this paper.
4 Suzumura (1992) explains these results as follows: "cooperation should reduce excessive 
duplication of R&D efforts in the presence of large spillovers. Note, however, that the R&D 
incentive of a single firm hinges squarely on the extent of appropriability of the R&D 
benefits, so that the presence of large R&D spillovers may drastically reduce the incentives 
for cost reduction(..). From this viewpoint, an enforceable agreement on cooperative R&D 
efforts seems to facilitate more commitments. The result of the net effect of the R&D 
cooperation hinges on the relative strength of these competing effects" (p.1308. footnote 
omitted). In case of large spillovers the latter effect outweighs the former leading in sum to 
increased R&D expenditures.
5 The analysis of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin has been generalized in several ways (see 




























































































profits" (Kamien et al. (1992, p.1294)). However, to understand all the economic 
aspects of cooperation in R&D we also have to consider research joint ventures 
(RJV): "agreements in which firms decide unilaterally on their R&D investments 
but the results of their R&D are fully shared" (Kamien et al. (1992, p.1294))6. 
Within RJVs spillovers are maximal while in R&D-cartels there is still room for 
duplicate research. If both contracts are agreed upon simultaneously, then firms 
are engaged in a ’RJV-cartel’.
Although it can be socially desirable to allow firms to collude in R&D by 
engaging in R&D-cartels or RJV-cartels, it remains a pursuit for additional 
social welfare with considerable risk. Firms are tempted to extend the R&D- 
collusion agreement tc the production stage. This induces a social welfare loss 
because of increased market power.
An obvious alternative to abandoning anti-trust laws is to subsidise private 
R&D7, a policy which is, in fact, conducted on a large scale8. Subsidising R&D 
may give rise to moral hazard (see Katz (1986) and Katz and Ordover (1990)), 
but does not weaken authorities’ control over monopoly power. Also, Hall 
(1992) finds substantial empirical evidence for a positive elasticity of R&D 
investment with respect to cash flow. His sample reveals further that leverage 
ratios and R&D investments are strongly negatively correlated. Hall’s findings 
indicate that subsidies may be more robust in stimulating R&D investments than 
allowing for any type of collusion.
In this paper R&D-subsidies are analysed by introducing an active 
government into the d’Aspremont-Jacquemin model. Prior to the R&D-setting 
stage this government subsidises R&D optimally according to d’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin’s social welfare function9. The main results of the analysis are that: 
(i) a government can increase social welfare through R&D-subsidies, (ii) 
subsidising non-collusive R&D optimally is more effective in raising R&D than
" Kamien et al. (1992) do not give precisely this definition of a RJV but it can be 
extracted from their definitions of R&D competition and RJVs.
7 See Spencer and Brander (1983).
" In 1985 the U.S., Germany and France respectively spent 13.3, 11.0 and 11.3 percent 
of their GNP on R&D subsidies. Japan subsidized R&D for 6.1% of GNP in 1983 
(Ritzen(1990)).
" Suzumura (1 9 9 2 ) questions this (first-best) welfare function since "the enforcement of 
the first-best arrangement may require considerable leverage on the government vis-à-vis 
private firms, something which may be hard to secure in reality" (p.1308). He then proposes 
a second-best welfare function presupposing that "the oligopolistic competition in the second 





























































































permitting RJVs or R&D-cartels without subsidisation, (iii) subsidising non- 
cooperative R&D or subsidising R&D-cartels leads to the same market outcome 
(and social welfare)10, (iv) yet only RJVs should be encouraged and subsidised. 
A subordinate result is that introducing R&D-subsidies ensures stability of the 
d’Aspremont-Jacquemin-games.
The organisation of this paper is as follows. In the next section the 
d’Aspremont-Jacquemin analysis is briefly described and some additional 
conclusions are drawn from their model. In Section 3 optimal subsidies are 
derived for the three d’Aspremont-Jacquemin games. Section 4 addresses the 
question wether authorities should subsidise R&D, allow firms to cooperate in 
R&D, or to subsidise cooperative R&D. Several conclusions are formulated in 
the last section.
2. Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) consider a duopoly with linear 
demand, cost and production functions. R&D is cost reducing and R&D-costs 
are quadratic, reflecting the diminishing returns to R&D investments. Profits of 
a single firm equal
= { a -b Q )q ~ { A -x i P * H Y — > i j ~  1,2, i* j, ( 1)
where Q (=q,+q2) is total production, jc, denotes R&D expenditures of firm i and (3 
measures the spillover effect, P E [0 ,1 ], It is assumed that a,b>0, Q z — and 
A z x i +Pxj . b
Table 1 summarizes all relevant variables resulting from solving 
completely the respective d’Aspremont and Jacquemin games11. Comparing the 
profits of a single firm for the respective games reveals that12
< %  < ji„, V p e [ o , i ) U ( l , i ] ,
In case of maximal spillovers this result reads as "subsidising RJVs or subsidising RJV- 
cartels lead to the same market outcome (and social welfare)".
11 The solution concepts to these games can be found in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 
(1 9 8 8 ).




























































































Table 1 Equilibrium Outcomes of the d’Aspremont-Jacquemin Games
No Cooperation in R&D 
No Cooperation in Production
Cooperation in R&D 
No Cooperation in Production
Cooperation in R&D 
Cooperation in Production
(“ -A)(2 - P ) ( a - A X l + P ) (f l - A ) ( l - p )
4 .5* y - ( 2 - P ) ( 1 - P ) 4 .5  by -(1  +P )2 4fcy - ( 1  +P )2
Q ' 3Y(a -A)
3y(a -A ) 2y(a -A )
4 . 5 b v - ( 2 - p ) ( w p ) 4 .5 f c y - ( l^ p ) 2 4 f c y - ( l . p ) 2
71 ' Y(a - A )2[4.5bY _ (2  -  P)2] y(a  - A ) 2 Y(a -A ) 2
2[4.5fcY - ( 2 - p ) ( l - p ) ] ’ 2[4.5fcy - ( 1  - p ) 2] 2 [ 4 f r y - ( 1 - p ) 2]
w y(o - A )2[9fcy “ (2  -  P)2] y(a - A ) :[9 fry -(1  - p ) 2] y(a -A ) 2[6 h y -(1  - p ) 2]
[4.5fey - ( 2  — P)( 1 - p ) ] 2 [4.5fcy -  (1 * P )2]2 [ 4 /> y - ( 1 - p ) 2]2
“ R& D lev e ls  and profits concern a sin g le  firm.
where /  denotes the fully non-cooperative game, II the game with only R&D 
collusion and III the full cooperation case. This comparison shows that 
irrespective of the spillover effect, firms will always want to collude in as many 
stages as possible.
From a social welfare point of view we have the following ranking13
wy > w- > w,„ v pG[o,i),
w„ > w; > w;„ v pe(i,i],
where W  is defined as the sum of producers’ and consumers’ surplus.
Clearly, there is no need for relaxing anti-trust regulation when spillovers 
are small. Allowing for cooperation in R&D is only desirable in case of 
substantial spillovers. But even then the collusive R&D agreement needs to be 
monitored very closely since firms are tempted to extend the collusive arrange­
ment to the production stage.
The cooperative R&D agreement considered by d’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988) is that of a R&D-cartel. To analyse RJVs in their model, the




























































































spillover parameter must be set to its maximum ( |3 = 1). In that case the first 
game describes a RJV, while RJV-cartels are captured by the second game.
If asked for, RJVs or RJV-cartels can be enforced without objections from 
the industry since in all three games considered firms have an incentive to share 
the fruits of their R&D efforts14. Whether or not these agreements are desirable 
needs to be judged by their effect on social welfare. It turns out that RJVs are 
only desirable when pre-cooperative spillovers are not very large15. However, 
it is always socially beneficial to extend an existing R&D-cartel to a RJV- 
cartel16.
On the other hand, we are led to conclude that firms should only be 
allowed to cooperate in R&D when pre-cooperative spillovers are large, and this 
collusive agreement should be that of a RJV-cartel. However, as already 
observed, this policy will evoke the danger of increased monopoly power since 
monopoly profits are within firms’ reach. To the extent that spillover size 
indicates ’resemblance’ between companies, and given that RJV-cartels are only 
desirable when spillovers are substantial, this threat is all the more real. Let us 
consider therefore another policy: that of subsidising private R&D.
3. R&D-subsidies in the d’Aspremont-Jacquemin-model
Following Spencer and Brander (1983) we introduce an R&D-subsidy, s, 
per unit of R&D. It is assumed that, in order to finance the total R&D-subsidy, 
firms are taxed for it (in the output stage). In other words, we consider a 
balanced-budget policy. By providing a R&D-subsidy, the government changes 
the cost structure of the R&D stage, and thus changes the set of actions (output 
and R&D expenditures) which are compatible with the two-stage Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium. (Firms cannot establish this alteration in cost structure themselves, 
since, by definition of a Nash-Cournot equilibrium, it is not in their interest to 
shift financial resources from the output stage to the R&D stage). However, the 
taxation in the output stage does not affect the equilibrium, since the appropriate 
tax is deducted from firms’ profits after the Nash-Cournot equilibrium is com­
puted. Therefore, differences in equilibrium profits and welfare with respect to 
the d’Aspremont-Jacquemin outcomes reflect only the influence of the subsidy.
14 Given the second order conditions it is true that S j i j / s p  > 0 for /= / , / / , / / / .
15 RJVs increase social welfare when ps0 .6  since W,‘ |p_oa - w i  , and on f l£ [0 ,1 ] 
the expression for social welfare follows a parabolic course.




























































































Given the demand, production and cost structures of the d’Aspremont- 
Jacquemin-model, profits of a single firm with R&D-subsidies are
Social welfare, defined as the sum of producers’ and consumers’ surplus, equals
where x - x r  f = 1,2.
In the following three subsections the respective d’Aspremont-Jacquemin 
games will be solved within this R&D-subsidy setting, using the concept of sub­
game perfect equilibrium.
3.1 No cooperation in either R&D or output17
Maximising (2) w.r.t. qi for i=l,2, conditional on x„ x , and s gives us the 
equilibrium quantity18
At the preceding stage, in which firms determine their R&D investment, profits 
can be written as
The equilibrium levels of R&D conditional on s, which follow from dx(x: rx. ;s)/dx; = 0 
for /,y=7,2, imj, are19
2
W(Q,x) = ( a - K b Q ) Q - ( A - ( l ^ ) x ) Q - y x \ (3)
(4)
_ (a-A)(2-p)+4.5fa ,_j  2
4-5by - (2 - P)( 1 +P) ’
(5)
17 In all games we consider only symmetric equilibria.
'* Variables marked with a hat are conditional equilibrium outcomes.




























































































As is to be expected, k&D-subsidies increase the equilibrium level of R&D 
investments. Also, for s equal to zero, (5) corresponds exactly to the d’Aspre- 
mont-Jacquemin expression20.
Substituting (4) and (5) into (3) gives us social welfare conditional on the 
R&D-subsidy
W(x(s)) = A [(a-A )+(1+P )x(s)]2-Yi(s)2, (6)
y b
where x(s) -  x (s) for i-1.2. The final step involves calculating the optimal 
R&D-subsidy. Maximising (6) w.r.t. s gives21-22
v- „ 3yP(a-A) (7)
4.5fry-2(l - P ) - '
Equation (7) states that the optimal R&D-subsidy is increasing in 
spillovers23. The incentive reducing effect of these externalities on R&D- 
investments is parried by an increasing subsidy. Indeed, without subsidies the 
derivative of x. with respect to P is negative. With subsidies, this derivative is 
positive, as will be shown in the proof of Proposition 2.
3.2 Cooperation in R&D. competition in output
When firms cooperate in R&D but compete in output, equilibrium quan­
tities are still given by (4). In the second stage firms maximise joint profits
n(jr,.,xy;s) = ft ,(x,x;s)+A2(.r,.r;s)
2 1 x 2= [ ( « -^ )+(2-P)*, + (2P-1)x; ]: - y_!_+sx :,
/.i yb i
2,1 In fact, this is true for all expressions in all games.
•' Variables marked with a star are unconditional equilibrium outcomes.
“  The second order condition requires that 2(1 -p )2<4.5foy. Note that this ensures (see 
(7)) that the optimal R&D-subsidy is positive.




























































































The symmetric equilibrium level of R&D conditional on s is given by24 
x(s) = + P )+4-5fe
4-5&Y - ( 1 + P)2 ' (8)
Comparing (8) with (5) we see that, in the case of equal per unit R&D- 
subsidies, R&D-cartelisation leads to increased R&D investments when spill­
overs are large (i.e. P>Vz). The opposite holds for small spillovers. This 
confirms (again) the validity of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin’s result. However, 
R&D-subsidies need not be equal under different forms of cooperation. Indeed, 
they turn out to be different, the implications of which are analysed in the next 
section.
Social welfare conditional on the optimal R&D level is given by (6) withx(s) 
given by (8). Maximizing this expression welfare with respect to s leads to25
s ■ = y(fl-A)(l +|3) (9)
" 4 .5fry-2(l-P)2’
Comparing s /  with s„' shows that the latter exceeds the former for p < Vi 
while for large spillovers the opposite holds.
3.3 Cooperation in both R&D and output
If firms act as a monopoly they maximise joint profits
2 xi*(<7, ,<72 **->,s) = (a - t>Q)Q -AQ+(xt + Px,)<7, + (x2 + Px,)</2 - I  Y~- -sx. 1,
i-i  2
in the first stage. The symmetric solution for the output stage, conditional on x
(= x, = x2) and s, is
q(x) -  -(fl-A>~(L_P>x, (10)
4 b
Joint profits are now given by
2J The second order condition requires that (1 -(3)2<4.5fry.
25 The second order condition requires that 2(1 - fi)2<4.5fri. Again this implies that the 





























































































*(*;*) = -^r[(«-A ) + ( l +P)x]2-Y*2+2u:.
4 b
The optima] level of R&D turns out to be26
= (fl ~A)(1 + P) +4fcs 
4 b v - ( l +p)2
Given (10) and (11) social welfare can be written as 
lV(i(j)) = A [ ( C -A) +(1 +P)i(5)]?-yje(.r)2. (12)
o b
Maximising (12) with respect to s leads to27
s - = Y(a-A)(l + P) (13)
8by -3(1 + p)2
According to (13), there are also social incentives to subsidize R&D in the 
monopoly case. This confirms the findings of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin that 
(in the absence of R&D subsidies) the social planner’s level of R&D is never 
realised by any market form.
3.4 Stability
Henriques (1990) shows that, for the fully non-cooperative game, the 
second order condition associated with the R&D stage is not sufficient to ensure 
stability in this stage. The R&D reaction functions cross correctly if | dxjdx \ < 1 
for i,j=l,2, i*j, i.e. (Henriques (1990,p.639))
| ( 2 - P ) ( 2 p - I ) | < j 
4.5fcy “(2 - P)2
Rearranging this stability condition leads to
The second order condition states (1 - P): <4by.
27 The second order condition requires that 3(1 ~P): <8<>y- A s in the previous two games 




























































































(14a)3(2-p)(l-p) < 4.5by, Vpe[0,i),
(2-p)(l+ p) < 4.5by, VPG(I,1]- <14b)
Combining both conditions implies 4.5 by > 6. But the second order condition 
for deriving the optimal subsidy in the non-collusive game gives 4.5by > 8. 
Therefore, introducing optimal R&D-subsidies ensures stability of the fully non- 
cooperative game.
4. To what avail?
Should a government provide R&D-subsidies, should it allow individual 
firms to cooperate in R&D, or should it do both? To answer these questions we 
first examine whether or not R&D-subsidies are socially desirable. In Proposi­
tion 1 it is shown that they are. Second, the impact of subsidising R&D is 
compared with allowing firms to cooperate in R&D. It appears that in general 
the former policy is more effective than the latter in promoting private R&D 
investments. This statement is formalised in Proposition 2. Third, the optimal 
’policy mix’ is derived. For a number of reasons, which will be explained 
below, we conclude that a government should subsidise RJVs and firms should 
not be allowed to cooperate in R&D.
Considering the effect of optimal R&D subsidies leads to the following 
proposition, the proof of which is given in the appendix.
PROPOSITION 1
For all three games considered, irrespective o f the spillover effect, (i) the 
optimal R&D-subsidy is positive and (ii) subsidising R&D optimally increases 
the level of R&D, output and social welfare, but lowers net profits.
According to Proposition 1, providing optimal R&D-subsidies (for which 
firms are taxed) increases consumers’ surplus but lowers producers’ surplus. The 
former effect dominates the latter with the net result that social welfare 
increases. There is however an upper limit to subsidizing R&D beyond which 
the level of R&D increases too much, which, compared to the zero subsidy case, 




























































































s, this limit is equal to two times the respective optimal R&D-subsidies. 
Moreover, these subsidies are functions of unknown parameters, in particular of 
the spillover effect. Given that spillover effects are never known exactly, R&D- 
subsidies should be provided with care28.
It could be argued that firms are not interested in R&D-subsidies since it 
lowers their net profits. But if a government wants to increase social welfare it 
can always tax firms and set R&D-subsidies accordingly. Given the nature of 
a Coumot-Nash equilibrium, firms’ best responses are then given by the 
equilibria as computed in the previous section.
To the extent that authorities evaluate all instruments available to foster 
investments in R&D, we have to compare both policy options considered here.
PROPOSITION 2
To promote private R&D, subsidising non-collusive R&D optimally is more 
effective than permitting R&D-cartels or allowing firms to engage in RJVs 
without subsidisation.
PROOF
Comparing the equilibrium level of non-cooperative, subsidised R&D, x,(s,'), 
with the non-subsidised R&D investment in the R&D-cartel, x;/(0), we have 
V p e [ 0 , l ]  that
■*,(*/) *„(0)<1
4-5 by ,
4.5 òy -2 ( 1 + P)2
The second order condition for deriving the optimal subsidy in the fully non- 
cooperative game ensures that the expression in brackets is positive. The partial 
derivative of non-collusive subsidised R&D with respect to p equals
dx,(s,') _ 2(a-A )[4.5by + 2 ( l  + P)2] 
dp [4.5by -2 ( 1 + P)2]2
and is positive Vp G[ 0 , l ] .  Then, realizing that
“  All optimal subsidies are increasing in p. Therefore, there is no danger in under 





























































































completes the proof, since x,(0) L t is the non-subsidised equilibrium R&D 
investment in a RJV.
■
Subsidising non-cooperative R&D not only leaves the control of monopoly 
power with the authorities, it is also more efficient in raising private R&D than 
allowing firms to participate in R&D-cartels or RJVs. This observation raises 
serious doubts as to the abandoning of anti-trust enforcement by the EC author­
ities concerning private R&D.
To compose the optimal ’policy mix’, we have to evaluate the effect of 
allowing firms to form R&D-cartels, RJVs or RJV-cartels, combined with subsi­
dising these agreements optimally. Table 2 summarizes all relevant variables 
resulting from solving the respective games of the previous section29.
PROPOSITION 3
Subsidising non-cooperative R&D or subsidising a R&D-cartel leads to the 
same market outcome and social welfare.
Proposition 3 states that encouraging R&D investments by allowing firms 
to participate in R&D-cartels and in addition subsidising this agreement, has the 
same effect as subsidising non-cooperative R&D. Since Proposition 3 holds for 
all values of (3, it is in particular valid for (3 = 1, i.e. optimally subsidising a 
RJV leads to the same increase in R&D as optimally subsidising a RJV-cartel.
As derived in the proof of Proposition 2, subsidised non-collusive R&D 
is increasing in (3, with the result that subsidised RJVs (or subsidised RJV- 
cartels), which imply (3 = 1, give rise to the highest level of private R&D311.
It remains to see whether, in terms of social welfare, subsidised RJVs (or 
subsidised RJV-cartels) are the optimal solution. To answer this question we 
first note that
wr ~w;;>w;;, vpe[o,i].
* , ( * / )  le=o >  ^ ( ° ) I P„
29 Note that equilibrium profits are less the corresponding subsidy amount since firms 
are assumed to be taxed for the R&D-subsidy in the third stage.




























































































Table 2 Optimal Subsidies, R&D, Total Output, Profits and Welfare
No Cooperation in R&D Cooperation in R&D Cooperation in R&D
No Cooperation in Production No Cooperation in Production Cooperation in Production
3yP(a -A ) Y (a -A )(l - P ) Y(a -A )(1  -P )
4.54>y -2 (1  * P )2 A.5by " 2(1 - P ) 2 8by -3 (1  » P )2
2(a - A ) ( l  -p )
4.5i>y -2 (1  -P )2
n  •< 3Y(f l -A)
4.5by -2 (1  - P ) 2
w .,b Y (a -'4 )2[ 4 .5 h Y - 4 ( l - P ) 2]
3 (a - A ) ( l - P )  
86y - 3 ( 1 - P ) 2
4 y( o -A)
8by -3 (1  - p ) 2
Y(a -A ) 2[ 1 6 h Y - 9 ( l - p ) 2]
2[4.5foY -2 (1  - P ) 2]2
w -  2y(a-A)2
4.5/>y -2 (1  - P ) 2
2 [ 8 b y - 3 ( l  - P ) 2]2 
3y("
8hy -3 (1  - p ) 2
“ Subsidies, R&D-levels and profits concern a single firm. 
h Profits are less the corresponding amount of R&D-subsidy.
A subsidised monopoly is never desirable. Yet firms are always in pursuit of 
this market form since
*/■' _ %  < vpe[o,i].
So again the danger of increased monopoly power, due to collusion in R&D, is 
apparent. And since there is no difference between W,‘' and Wu ', there is no 
reason for allowing firms to cooperate in R&D. Finally, note that W,'s is rising 
in p 31. Therefore, the optimal policy is for the authorities to encourage firms 
to form RJVs and subsidise this agreement accordingly.




























































































Subsidising R&D, for which firms are taxed, should be considered as a 
serious alternative to abandoning anti-trust laws to stimulate private R&D 
investments. This policy preserves not only the control over monopoly power 
with the authorities, but is also more effective in promoting R&D investments 
than permitting R&D-cartels or RJVs. Moreover, providing optimal R&D-subsi- 
dies leads to an increase in social welfare. Also, subsidising non-cooperative 
R&D or subsidising a R&D-cartel leads to the same market outcome (and 
welfare). In particular, subsidising a RJV or subsidising a RJV-cartel leads to 
the same market outcome (and welfare). According to the analysis presented 
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Appendix. Proof of Proposition 1
part (i)
The second order conditions associated with deriving the optimal R&D-subsidies 
guarantee that the denominators of the respective subsidies are positive. By 
restrictions on the parameters of the model (y>0,a>A  and p £ [ 0 , l ] )  the same 
is true for the respective numerators.
part (ii)
R&D
The levels of R&D for the respective games can be written as
x, ' = x, ; 1
*n = xii 1
27/>Py
2[4.5/ry - 2( 1 + P)2](2 - P) 
4.5/ry .
xm = xnr 1 +
4.5/ry -2(1 +P)2
4/ry , 
8^y - 3(1 -p)2 ''





























































































The differences between optimal-subsidy total output and zero-subsidy total 
output for the respective games are given by
q -*-q  ’ = ___________ 9 y (a -A )P ( l+P )___________  > Q
[ 4 . 5 f c Y - 2 ( l + P ) 2 ] [ 4 . 5 f c Y - ( 2 - p ) ( l + P ) ]
Q  * - Q -  = ____________ 3 y ( a - A ) ( l + p ) 2____________ >  Q
" "  [ 4 . 5  b y - 2 ( 1  + P ) 2 ] [ 4 . 5 b y - ( 1  + P ) 2 ]
Qn; - Q m - _______2Y(fl~A)(1+P)2_______> 0.
,  [ 8 b y - 3 ( l  + P ) 2 ] [ 4 f e y - ( 1  ~ P ) 2 ]
The inequalities hold for (3£(0,1].
Welfare
The differences between optimal-subsidy social welfare and zero-subsidy social 
welfare for the respective games are given by
W ,-W ,  = 9 y (a -A)24.5fryP2
[ 4 . 5 b y - 2 ( l ^ ) 2] [ 4 . 5 b y - ( 2 - p ) ( l +p)]2
> 0 ,
w  '-w' - y(fl -A)24.5fry(l +P)2 > 0
" [ 4.5by -  2 ( 1 + P)2][ 4.5by - ( 1 + P)2 ]2
Wn;-W m -  _____ V(a-A)22 M 1 - P ) 2 > o.
[ 8/?y -3(1 + P)2] [4by-(1 +P)2]2





























































































The differences between optimal-subsidy profits and zero-subsidy profits for the 
respective games are given by
3Y(a -A)24 .5frYP[4 .5feY(2-PM5p-4) ( l+p)2] < Q 
2[4.5fcy-2( l  +p)2]2[4 .5fry- (2 -p) ( l  + P)]2
Jin Jin ~ ■i(n-A)2 4 . 5bv ( l+P)2
[ 4.5fry -  ? ( 1 + P )2 ]2 [ 4.5/ry ~ ( 1 + P )2 ] 
ÏÎA ~A)24by( 1 + P)2
< 0 ,
2 [4by -(  1 + P)2] [8by _ 3 ( 1 + P)2]2
< 0 .
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